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I. INTRODUCTION
A new version of an old trend is rising in the advertising world. Often
called "alternative" or "guerilla" marketing, the trend finds marketers
giving expensive items from expensive product lines to trendsetting college
students, potentially hot showbiz players, and young nightclub-goers with
the understanding that each will use and talk up the products.I Further, drug
companies frequently pay celebrities to tout pharmaceuticals during their
• 2°
public appearances. Other examples include extensive product placements
in movies and on television programs, and sponsorship of events and
concerts. 3 Such alternative marketing only represents a tiny fraction of the
$236 billion spent on advertising in America, but strong evidence shows
that the money spent on these alternative marketing strategies is growing
rapidly.4
The recent spike in the marriage of content and advertisements is a
response to machines like TiVo, 5 which allow users to record many hours
of television programming while skipping commercials. 6  Network
1. Daniel Eisenberg, It's an Ad, Ad, Ad, Ad World, TIME, Sept. 2, 2002, at 38.
2. Id. For example, "Lauren Bacall praised Visudyne as a treatment for macular
degeneration, Rob Lowe plugged Neulasta to combat a side effect of chemotherapy, and
Kathleen Turner directed viewers to a website for a drug for rheumatoid arthritis." Id at 39.
Bacall failed to mention that she was being paid for the promotion, as do many other such
celebrities. In response, CNN adopted a policy of announcing any financial ties between its
interview subjects and corporations, a stance which ABC, CBS, and NBC have suggested
they will follow. Id.
3. id
4. Id.
5. Katie Dean, Is That a TiVo Under the Tree?, WIRED NEWS, at www.wired.com/
news/holidays/0,1882,56828,00.html (Dec. 20, 2002). TiVo is one example of a new fad in
television viewing, digital video recording. TiVo is a subscription-based service which
allows "viewers to record, rewind and pause live television, as well as fast-forward past
commercials." Id. The TiVo system consists of a "small black box... [which is]... hooked
up to the telephone and cable/satellite lines in a home. It can store up to 80 hours of
programs." Kendis Gibson, Will TiVo Revolutionize Television Viewing? (Dec. 5, 2002), at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/SHOWBIZ/12/04/hln.connect.tivo/.
6. See Associated Press, Stealth Advertising to Foil Ad Zappers (Jan. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/1 0/entertainment/main536018.shtml
[hereinafter Ad Zappers]; Carrie MacMillan, Plot Twists, PROMO, (Aug. 1, 2002), available
at www.promomagazine.com/ar/marketingplot twists; Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 39. Due
to fears about TiVo, AOL-Time Warner has begun work on a new rival system, called
Mystro TV. See David D. Kirkpatrick, AOL is Planning a Fast-Forward Answer to TiVo,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at C2. "Mystro TV is a technology that uses a cable system
itself to provide viewers capabilities similar to computerized personal video recorders like
TiVo: watching programs on their own schedules, with fast-forward and rewind." Id.
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executives fear that the use of such devices bodes very ill for future
advertising revenues, from which networks draw a bulk of their profits.
Jamie Kellner, CEO of Turner Broadcasting System, spoke of his concerns
at the Association of National Advertisers' 2002 national conference,
stating that "the [television] business cannot exist as its current model is
today unless consumers are willing to give time for [advertisements]."' 8
Kellner further asserted his belief that "advertising 9has driven this country.
Without advertising, we will damage this country."
These fears, echoed by other network executives, are powerful, but
may be either premature' ° or altogether unwarranted."1 Regardless, these
same executives have time and time again adopted the alternative or
guerilla marketing strategies outlined above. These activities have possible
implications far beyond the executives' individual networks. The more
advertisers fear that their messages will not reach the intended audience of
television viewers, the more that advertisers will likely seek other outlets
for these messages.
These other outlets could include forums with obvious dangers
attached, such as a larger proliferation of overly distracting advertisements
on highways, including on vehicles. Advertising on some alternative outlets
could pose more subtle dangers. One of these possible dangerous
alternative outlets is public access television, which receives little
However, Mystro TV further "lets networks set the parameters, dictating which shows users
can reschedule, and it also creates ways for networks to insert commercials." Id. (emphasis
added).
7. See Kate McArthur, Turner CEO Lambasts Ad-Avoiding Technologies (Oct. 11,
2002), at http://www.adage.com/news.cms?newsld=36283.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. As of November 12, 2002, just over 500,000 American homes subscribed to TiVo,
less than the total number of American homes with outhouses (671,000). Bradley Johnson,
More U.S. Homes Have Outhouses Than TiVos (Nov. 4, 2002), at http://www.adage.com/
news.cms?newsld=3647 1. In addition, TiVo forecasts showed a drop in new subscribers in
the final quarter of 2002, the first such drop since TiVo hit the market in 1999. Id.
11. "Most forecasters . . . are predicting an increase in ad spending for 2003 of 3
percent to 7 percent .... [In 2002] ad spending showed a modest uptick of 2.6 percent
compared with 2001, when spending fell 6.5 percent, the largest decline since 1938." Stuart
Elliott, Threat of War Already Curbs the Budgets of Marketers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003,
at Cl. Furthermore, "[t]here are even predictions that the coming market for commercial
time on broadcast TV networks sold ahead of the 2003-2004 season could increase 10
percent atop the robust gains registered [in the spring of 2002]." Id. However, executives'
fears may be validated by the fact that those with digital video recorders skip 72.3% of
commercials, while those who record with VCRs only skip 15.6%, and those who ignore
ads while watching television only ignore 44.6% of the commercials aired. Wayne
Friedman, 72.3% of PVR Viewers Skip Commercials (July 2, 2002), at
http://www.adage.com/news.cms?newsld=35293.
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protection from corporate advertisers under the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 ("CCPA"). 12 Under the CCPA, municipalities are free
to adopt their own protective contractual measures with cable operators in
their cable franchise agreements. Many municipalities, including New
York City, deng the right to place advertisements on airwaves reserved for
public access. However, these contractual terms are not mandated by the
CCPA. This lack of protection is striking since, as argued, infra, corporate
advertising often negatively distorts media content. Corporate advertising
on public access channels could have alarming implications for those
wishing to utilize their only meaningful access to public airwaves.
This Note urges municipalities, cable franchisees, and courts to adopt
the same protections afforded to the public by the Oyster Bay, New York,
cable franchise agreement. Section II outlines the relevant provisions of the
CCPA, the New York state regulations regarding cable franchise
agreements, the Cable Franchise Agreement between the Oyster Bay, New
York, and Cablevision Systems Corporation, and the recent Second Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Goldberg v. Cablevision Systems
Corporation. Section III of this Note argues that corporate advertising has
historically had several adverse effects on the content of television
programming. Section IV further describes the recent upswing in guerilla
marketing tactics. This Note concludes in Section V with an argument for
municipalities, cable franchisees, and courts to structure and interpret
statutes and cable franchise agreements so as to prohibit advertising on
public access channels.
II. THE STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK OF
CABLE FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS AND PEG CHANNELS
A. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
The CCPA authorizes municipalities to enter into agreements with
cable providers to set the ground rules for providing cable service for
citizens of the municipality.' 4 In these agreements, municipalities often
impose conditions on cable operators wishing to utilize public rights-of-
12. See 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000). The CCPA provides the framework under which
municipalities are free to negotiate with franchise cable providers to provide cable service
for their citizens. Id. §§ 521-73.
13. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 595.4(a)(1) (2001) (restricting public
access channels to noncommercial uses).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 521-73 (2000).
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way.' 5 One such condition allowed for by the CCPA is that municipalities
may establish certain channels to be set aside for public access, educational
access, or governmental access. 16  Such public, educational, and
governmental access channels are generally referred to as "PEG"
channels.17 The CCPA requires that if PEG channels are not being used by
members of the community or the government, the cable franchise
agreement shall set forth how those channels will be used by the cable
provider, as well as any and all "rules and procedures under which such
permitted use shall cease." 18 The most significant CCPA limitation on the
establishment of PEG channels in cable franchise agreements is that "a
cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over any public,
educational, or governmental use of channel capacity provided pursuant to
this section."'
19
The CCPA sets forth one exception to this broad rule against cable
operators' exercise of editorial control over the content of PEG channels,
namely that "a cable operator may refuse to transmit any public access
program or portion of a public access program which contains obscenity,
indecency, or nudity." ° In implementing the CCPA, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") requires public, educational, and
governmental access programming mandated by the cable franchise
agreement to be carried on the basic tier of cable, meaning that subscribers
must receive PEG channels when they order the lowest-priced service
available from the cable operator.
21
In passing the CCPA, Congress recognized that "[o]ne of the greatest
challenges over the years in establishing communications policy has been
15. William E. Lee, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REv.
867, 867 (1983).
16. See 47 U.S.C. § 53 1(b) (2000). The rights-of-way consist of the cables, above- and
underground, that are to be used to carry the transmission of the cable provider's signals.
See generally Lee, supra note 15.
17. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655,
4667. See also Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 189 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 531(d)(2) (2000). It is a popular conception that channels designated
for use by the public are not fully utilized for this purpose. See Ed Foley, Comment, The
First Amendment as Shield and Sword: Content Control of PEG Access Cable Television,
27 CAP. U. L. REv. 961 (1999). Initially, this conception appears to be true, as "only about
five percent of [public access] programming was scheduled, and these programs were
viewed primarily by their participants." Id. at 965 (footnote omitted). Some stark exceptions
to this general rule do exist, however, including "[a] PEG channel in Bloomington, Indiana
[which] is watched by fifty percent of the adult population, and in Kalamazoo, Michigan,
[where] eighty-six percent reported watching public access programming." Id.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 53 1(e) (2000).
20. Id.
21. 47 C.F.R. § 76.901(a) (2002).
Number 1] 243
244 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL [Vol.56
assuring access to the electronic media by people other than the licensees
or owners of those media."' 22 Congress further recognized the utility of
cable in providing access to the airwaves to those who, up to that point, hadS 23
not had the resources to obtain meaningful access to the airwaves. To
remedy this situation, the CCPA established public access channels as "the
video equivalent of the speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to the
• ,,24
printed leaflet. Public access channels were designed to provide access
to electronic media to those groups who previously had little to no such25
access. PEG channels were also to inform citizens of the actions of their
local government. 2 6 The CCPA specifically encourages municipalities to
guarantee in their cable franchise agreements that PEG channels would
continue to serve these ends.
27
In establishing the framework for carriage of PEG channels, Congress
recognized previous First Amendment challenges brought by cable
operators against access provisions.2 8 Nonetheless, Congress believed that
the CCPA's particular access provisions furthered the goals of the First
Amendment by "establish[ing] a form of content-neutral structural
regulation which will foster the availability of a 'diversity of viewpoints' to
the listening audience." '29 Since the First Amendment is designed to ensure
such diverse viewpoints, PEG channel requirements fit well within the
22. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 30. The CCPA itself contains six declared purposes of the
Act:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth
and development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are
responsive to the needs and interests of the local community;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State and local authority
with respect to the regulation of cable systems;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide
the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public;
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable
operators against unfair denials of renewals where the operator's past performance
and proposal for future performance meet the standards established by this
subchapter; and
(6) promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary
regulation that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems.
47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000) (emphasis added).
23. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 30.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 31.
29. Id.
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Supreme Court's constitutional framework. 30 Congress concluded that
"there can be no doubt that the purposes of access regulations serve a most
significant and compelling governmental interest-promotion of the basic
underlying values of the First Amendment itself"
31
Under the CCPA, several hundreds of municipalities have
implemented original cable franchise agreements and renewed existing
cable franchise agreements. 32 In forming such an agreement, municipalities
generally follow four steps:
First, the authority assesses community needs and policy options
through means such as consultant studies and special citizen task
forces that hold extensive public hearings. Second, the franchising
authority adopts a request for proposals (RFP)... [which] describes
the cable system and services that the community desires . . . [and]
outlines the information that the franchising authority seeks from
applicants concerning their background, financial qualifications,
proposed system design, construction plan, rates, and services. Third,
after firms bid for the franchise, the franchising authority evaluates the
bids.... Last, the authority selects an applicant and executes a
franchise agreement incorporating the proposals submitted in the bid.
Once the franchising authority and the chosen applicant negotiate this
agreement, the franchising authority adopts an ordinance or resolution
authorizing the agreement. Construction of the cable system theii may
begin.
Throughout this process, as well as throughout the similar process for
renewing existing franchise agreements, municipalities are free to place
30. Id. (quoting Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). See also Red
Lion Brdcst. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment
to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail,
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market...").
31. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 34. However, Congress noted that required carriage of
PEG channels may cause First Amendment difficulties if the rights of access were
contingent upon specific speech. Id. at 34-35. For instance, Congress noted that in Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), "the Court overturned a contingent access scheme
because the means chosen impinged on the journalistic discretion of the newspaper." H.R.
REP. No. 98-934, at 34 (citation omitted). In Tornillo, the right of access to the newspaper
"was triggered by the statements the newspaper made. Thus not only would the newspaper
have to print what reason told them not to print, but the right of reply would chill the
editors' own expression." Id. (citations omitted). PEG channel requirements differ from the
regulations at issue in Tornillo as
requir[ing] cable operators to set aside channel capacity does not chill cable
operators' speech.... [C]able operators act as [conduits]. They do not exercise
their editorial discretion over the programming; nor are they prevented or chilled
in any way from presenting their own views and programming on the vast
majority of channels otherwise available to them.
Id. at 34-35.
32. Lee, supra note 15, at 869.
33. Id. at 871-72.
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restrictions on the franchisors as outlined in the CCPA in exchange for
permission to install above- and underground cable networks and to use
public rights-of-way. 34 This system of cable franchising has been
recognized and held valid by the United States Supreme Court, as well as
by several circuit courts of appeal.
36
B. New York's Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and
Regulations
A typical example of the restrictions placed into cable franchise
agreements may be found in the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and
Regulations of the State of New York ("NYCRR"). The NYCRR states that
certain conditions shall be imposed on proposed cable franchisors. 37 A
cable franchise agreement would only meet the approval of the
Commission on Cable Television if it contained, among other provisions,
limitations on the term of the agreement, guarantees that the franchisor will
not practice employment discrimination, and minimum channel capacity38
for the cable system. The NYCRR further allows agreements to contain
additional terms and conditions that are not inconsistent with all applicable
laws.
39
The NYCRR also sets forth the minimum PEG channel access
standards that must be met in order to form a valid cable franchise
agreement. Under the NYCRR, if the cable system contains at least twenty-
one channels, that system must contain a minimum of one public access
station and one station designated for educational and governmental use.
40
If the cable system carries less than twenty-one channels, the NYCRR
requires it to carry only one PEG channel.4' Finally, neither the cable
television franchisee nor the municipality are to exercise any editorial
control over the content of any PEG channel designated under this
42
section. The NYCRR defines a public access channel as "a channeldesignated for [noncommercial] use by the public on a first-come, first-
34. See id. at 872.
35. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
36. See, e.g., Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1999); Time Warner
Cable of New York City v. Bloomberg, L.P., 118 F.3d 917 (2nd Cir. 1997).
37. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 595.1 (2001).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 595.2.
40. Id. § 595.4(b).
41. Id. § 595.4(b)(2).
42. Id. § 595.4(c)(8)-(9).
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served, nondiscriminatory basis."' 43
C. Goldberg v. Cablevision Systems Corporation
Consistent with the NYCRR, the Town of Oyster Bay, New York,
entered into a cable franchise agreement with Cablevision Systems
Corporation ("CSC"), whereby CSC agreed to provide a minimum of
thirty-six channels of service to citizens of the town.4 4 Two of the channels
were set aside exclusively for PEG access programming.45 Under the
agreement, CSC was to develop and enforce rules for access to PEG
channels that were consistent with the applicable federal and state laws.
46
In accordance with these guidelines, CSC instituted a series of access
rules, which each person or organization submitting access programming
47
was to follow. 48 Among these provisions, Access Rule 3(d) prohibited all
material that "promotes or is designed to promote the sale of commercial
products or services ... in connection with any Access Programming."
' 49
Robert M. Goldber 0is a coordinator of the Public Access Movement
of Long Island ("PAM"). PAM "is an association of video producers and
supporters that work to ensure that community communications channels
are available, convenient, and inexpensive." 51 In 1999, Goldberg submitted
a program entitled America's Defense Monitor, which was distributed by
the Center for Defense Information ("CDI"). 52 CSC cablecasted many
installments of the program on its public access channel but refused to air
one segment that violated Access Rule 3(d) by running a twenty-five-
second advertisement offering copies of the tape from CDI for $19.95. 53
43. Id § 595.4(a) (emphasis added).
44. Goldberg v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 261 F.3d 318, 322 (2nd Cir. 2001).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 322 n.8 (CSC defines "Access Programming" as "[v]ideo and audio material
provided by Access Channel Users on the [PEG] Access Channel(s), which programming
concerns matters of interest to and/or is about Cablevision's service area.").
48. Id. at 322.
49. Id. (footnote omitted). However, Access Rule 3(d) did allow for the presentation of
"'billboard' type notices announcing the source of funding (if any) for the production of the
program." Id.
50. Memorandum from Robert M. Goldberg, A Coordinator of the Public Access
Movement of Long Island, to Public Access producers and supporters (Feb. 27, 2002) (on
file with the Journal).
51. Id.
52. Goldberg, 261 F.3d at 322. America's Defense Monitor was originally produced by
CDI to "[further] its primary objective of sharing its views on military issues." Id.
53. Id. The price of the videotape was later increased to $39 per copy. Id.
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Although the tapes were sold for little or no profit to either CDI or
Goldberg, 54 CSC indicated that it would show the segment in question only
if all references to sale of the videotape and transcript were removed.
Goldberg removed the advertisement from the offending segment of the
program and from all those succeeding it before submitting them to CSC
for airing, a process that took him about an hour for each submission.
56
Goldberg filed suit on March 25, 1999, in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that CSC's refusal to
cablecast America's Defense Monitor intact with the advertisement violated
both the federal CCPA and the state NYCRR regarding control of PEG
programming by municipalities and cable franchisees. 57 Specifically,
Goldberg alleged a violation of the CCPA provision that "a cable operator
shall not exercise any editorial control over any [PEG programming], 58
and a separate violation of the New York statutory and regulatory
provisions against such editorial control.59 The district court granted
summary judgment for CSC, concluding that the program had, indeed,
contained an offer by Goldberg "to enter into a commercial transaction
with his viewers," thereby constituting commercial programming, and that
. . . .. 60
CSC was within its rihts to refuse to air the segment. Goldberg appealed
both of these rulings.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals first reaffirmed its
previous holding in Time Warner Cable v. Bloomberg, L.P.62 that cable
operators retain the right to refuse any submitted programming that does
not meet the legal standard for dissemination on a public access channel.
63
Next, the court analyzed whether or not the segment of America 's Defense
54. Id. at 322-23. CSC conceded that $19.95 "cover[ed] the cost of a blank videotape
and the cost of having the program dubbed onto the blank videotape and provid[ed] CDI
with a little money left over ... and is a very small income stream for CDI." Id.
Additionally, Goldberg was not the "seller" of the videotapes, and did not receive any
profits from the sale. Id. at 323.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 320.
58. 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (2000).
59. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 595.4(c) (2001); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §
229(3) (McKinney 2000) ("No cable television company may prohibit or limit any program
or class or type of program presented over a leased channel or any channel made available
for public access or educational purposes.").
60. Goldberg, 261 F.3d at 323.
61. Id.
62. 118 F.3d 917 (2d Cir. 1997).
63. Goldberg, 261 F.3d at 323.
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Monitor that CSC had refused qualified as public access programming. 64
The court noted that since the CCPA does not adequately define "PEG
programming," it was proper to turn to applicable New York State laws and
regulations to determine the proper boundaries of public access
• 65
programming. The court concluded that the New York State regulations
and the Oyster Bay franchise agreement require PEG programming to be
noncommercial, and that "CSC was authorized to reject the CDI segment
submitted by Goldberg only if it constituted commercial
programming.
66
The court then considered the proper definition of the term
"noncom ercial 6 7
"noncommerciai. 6It found that speech is not necessarily "commercial"
under the standard set forth in the NYCRR for determining whether or not
a program qualifies for public access airing merely because it qualifies as
"commercial speech" under First Amendment analysis.68 Instead, in order
to determine the meaning of "noncommercial" in the context of the
NYCRR, the court assessed the public policy behind affording preferential
PEG channel access to "noncommercial" programming.
6 9
In performing this analysis, the court first noted that advertisements
for the sale of a video or transcript of educational and ideological programs
are a common way for such programs to conclude. The court recognized
that these types of offers help organizations spread their message to a much
larger audience, and hence that such offers were not "clearly inconsistent"
with allowable public access programming. 71 Additionally, the court noted
that such offers actually further the First Amendment's goals of providing a
diversity of viewpoints and stimulating wider public debate "by allowing
the viewer to further disseminate, study, remember, criticize, discuss, or
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 325-26 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
67. The court noted that the advertisement in the CDI program did meet several
dictionary definitions of the terms "commercial" and "commerce." Id. at 326 n.10. The
court further noted, however, that "[t~o the extent that CDI's advertisements were part of its
effort to disseminate its message, they did in a sense do 'more than propose a commercial
transaction,"' and therefore did not meet the technical definition of "commercial speech" as
it was set forth in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). Goldberg, 261 F.3d at 327 n.12. Nevertheless, since the district
court had so ruled, the court "assume[d] that CDI's advertisements did 'no more than
propose a commercial transaction,' and were therefore 'commercial speech' for purposes of
First Amendment analysis." Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d
398, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
68. Goldberg, 261 F.3d at 327.
69. Id. at 327-28.
70. Id. at 328.
71. Id.72.1d.
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rebut the message conveyed in the program." 72 The court finally noted its
concern that a broad reading of the limits of PEG programming would
permit cable operators "to bar disfavored programming under the guise of
enforcing such limits."
73
Due to these concerns, the court concluded that whether such offers
constituted commercial programming depended on the function of the
advertisement. 74 If the advertisement for tapes of the program was designed
solely to disseminate the program's message to a wider audience, then the
advertisement furthered the goals of PEG channel requirements and, thus,
should be permissible. 75 However, if the advertisement was designed for
the financial gain of the program's producers, then the advertisement would
be far more problematic. Requiring cable operators to carry this type of
advertisement on public access channels "may threaten the diversity of
those channels by opening them to an onslaught of material properly
carried in paid media, thereby crowding out legitimate PEG programming
that has no other effective avenue of dissemination.
' 76
The court noted that distinguishing between these two categories of
advertising would likely be a difficult task, and therefore proposed several
factors to aid in making such a determination. 77 First, the burden to show
entitlement to PEG access must be placed on the applicant for those
airwaves, as that person is in a better position to prove the function of the
advertising in question.78 Second, if the tapes advertised on the program
were only being sold for cost and not for profit, the advertising would
likely be "noncommercial." 79 Finally, in cases where this question of
"cost" or "profit" is unclear, the determination should be informed by the
nature of the person or organization submitting the program and the nature
of the program itself. If the entity submitting the program is a nonprofit
organization, it would be much less likely that the offer of the video and/or
transcript would have a purely financial motivation. 81 If, however, the
73. Id. (quoting Time Warner Cable of New York City v. Bloomberg, L.P., 118 F.3d
917, 928 (2nd Cir. 1997)). This warning is especially prevalent due to the considerable
incentives granted by the NYCRR to exclude as much public access programming as
possible, which include provisions allowing cable operators to use vacant PEG channels for
commercial programming. Goldberg, 261 F.3d at 328.
74. Goldberg, 261 F.3d at 329.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 330.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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submitting entity is a profit-making organization, then the offer for sale of
the tapes would likely be part of a larger financial scheme. 82 Likewise, an
advertisement selling tapes of a program discussing "ideas at the core of
the seller's educational or ideological goal" is much more likely to be
"noncommercial" than would be an advertisement selling tapes of a
program that is "devoid of ideas or information."
' 83
In applying these factors to Goldberg's submission of CDI's
America's Defense Monitor, the court found that the evidence was
inconclusive. CDI's director of television had stated that the purpose of
the advertisement was to "further disseminate our point of view."
85
However, the purchase price of the tapes exceeded CDI's production
costs. 86 Therefore, it was unclear if CDI's offer was solely intended to
further disseminate its own views, or if CDI intended to generate any
stream of income through the sales of the tape. 87 Due to this lack of
evidence, the court remanded the case to the district court for
determinations not inconsistent with its opinion.
88
III. THE HISTORICAL DANGER OF ADVERTISING:
CONTROLLING CONTENT
Leonard Matthews, a former president of the American Association of
Advertising Agencies, said, "business and the entire free enterprise system
need to be supported by the media." 89 Matthews further noted, however,
that the "mutually healthy relationship" that existed between business and
the free enterprise system had been "impaired in recent years by the
overzealous actions of a small but very visible group of investigative
reporters who have made a practice of slugging advertisers while their
associates in the sales department were accepting an order from the same
company."
90
Matthews's statement illustrates a serious problem inherent in the
interplay of the media and the advertisers that support them, especially in
light of the incredibly large role advertisers play in funding the media.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 55 (6th ed., 2000) (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 56 (citation omitted).
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Virtually all television broadcasting revenue flows from advertisers. 9 1 This
massive amount of money 92 represents a massive amount of power.
Corporate advertisers often use the power of their advertising dollars either
to distort or censor content produced by others or to purchase time for
content that favors their own interests. 93 These two powers, the power to
"censor" content and the power to "purchase" content, allow advertisers to
force media to do three things. First, the media must provide favorable
treatment to advertisers' products and broader corporate interests. 94 Second,
the media's content must encourage the audience to spend money. 95 Third,
the media's content must garner an affluent and free-spending audience.
96
Unfortunately, advertisers do not merely have the potential to use
their powers to achieve these three goals. Advertisers regularly employ
various tactics to meet each of these ends, thereby greatly distorting the
content of the media.
A. Garnering Favorable Treatment ofAdvertisers 'Products and
Goals
Perhaps the largest goal of advertisers is to see that their products and
other interests are portrayed in the most positive light possible.
"Advertisers would prefer that the media avoid, bury, or downplay media
content that casts their products, firm, or industry in a negative light; better
would be media that present content supportive of their interests and their
products." 97 Advertisers have many techniques to achieve these goals,
including placing institutional ads within the content of the media and
threatening to withhold advertising revenue from the media.
1. Placing Institutional Ads: The Mobil Oil Story
One of the most prevalent techniques used by advertisers to ensure
that their products and other interests are positively portrayed in the media
91. See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994).
92. The sheer amount of money spent on advertising is staggering. In 1981, the
combination of "[n]ewspapers, magazines, and broadcasters ... collected $33 billion a year
from advertisers." BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 121 (citation omitted). Today's advertising
revenues dwarf those of twenty years ago; television ads alone in 1999 brought in almost
$37 billion. Id. at xxxiii.
93. BAKER, supra note 91, at 44.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 50.
A ROUND "PEG " FOR A ROUND HOLE
is to pepper institutional advertisements throughout the media.
98
Corporations have spent upwards of $3 billion to promote "the corporation
as hero," and to explain capitalist theory. 99 One company in particular,
Mobil Oil, has perfected this strategy.
During the 1970s, Mobil Oil bought ads next to editorials in several
newspapers, securing a spot that was eventually known by editors as "the
Mobil position."' 00 Mobil also had its own Sunday supplement column in
thousands of community newspapers and disseminated its antimedia
commercials through an informal network of television stations.1
01
Furthermore, Mobil funded the publication of many books. 10 2 During its
advertising blitz, Mobil placed ads in, among other sources, The New York
Times, Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post that expressed
Mobil's own anger and weariness with what it contended was the media's
"lack of devotion to the true principles of the First Amendment." 10 3 In
addition to attacking unfriendly media, Mobil also ran self-laudatory ads
detailing the company's own struggle against pollution.1
0 4
One particular use by Mobil of its advertising power came in 1981,
when the company attacked a reporter for United Press International
("UPI"). While working in the Washington, D.C., bureau of UPI, reporter
Edward F. Roby was to write a piece on a report prepared by the Financial
Reporting System of the U.S. Department of Energy that detailed the
revenues and taxes of oil companies. 105 While analyzing the report, Roby
noticed that while the average U.S. corporation paid 23.7% of its revenues
in taxes, Mobil and the other twenty-five largest oil companies paid only
98. Harry Keyishian, "We Bring Good Things to Life' "We're Always There": The
AdWorld of GE, in ADVERTISING AND CULTURE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVEs 49 (Mary
Cross ed., 1996) ("Institutional advertising is designed to articulate corporate values-or
what the corporation wishes the public to believe are its values.").
99. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 58 (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 59.
101. Id.
102. Id. "[Mobil's] book, The Genius of Arab Civilization, published by New York
University Press, is one of a series promoting countries where it has oil interests. Other
books and reports it has sponsored have been published by MIT Press and Hudson
Institute." Id.
103. Id. at 59-60. One of Mobil's ads proclaimed, "Any restraint on free discussion is
dangerous. Any policy that restricts flow of information or ideas is potentially harmful." Id.
at 60. Interestingly, "Mobil..., a major sponsor of public broadcasting, urged the Public
Broadcasting System to suppress the showing of a film that would upset its oil partner,
Saudi Arabia." Id. (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 60. However, "[w]hen a national business group of which [Mobil was] a
member, the Council of Economic Priorities, issued a pollution report that mentioned
Mobil's poor record on pollution, Mobil withdrew its support from the council." Id.
105. Id. at 62.
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12.4% of their own revenues in taxes. 106 Roby wrote a story containing this
information for the UPI newswires in June of 1981.107
Mobil's response to Roby's story was swift and strong. The company
started with an ad headlined "WON'T THEY EVER LEARN?" for "the
Mobil position" of eleven of America's largest newspapers. 108 The ad read,
"Once again.., newspaper readers across the country were recently
presented with a massive dose of misinformation on oil industry taxes."
1
The ad denounced Roby's article as "misleading" and "blatantly incorrect,"
and concluded by stating, "This is not the first time the oil industry has
been falsely accused of underpaying its taxes ... we hope that UPI will set
the record straight so the American public can make judgments based on
accurate and reliable data.""110 Mobil accused Roby of misunderstanding
the tax structure under which oil companies operated, stating that the
income of oil companies is taxed by the country where the oil was drilled,
and that U.S. law then credits the amounts paid by oil companies for
foreign income taxes to avoid double taxation by the IRS.
11 1
Despite Mobil's claims of fair dealing, secret documents of the
Internal Revenue Service going back to 1950 backed up Roby's allegations
of wrongdoing. The documents indicated that the tax laws of Saudi Arabia,
where Mobil often drilled for oil, were partially drafted by Mobil Oil and
other oil companies. 112 When drilling in Saudi Arabia, oil companies were
required to pay a royalty rate for each gallon withdrawn. 113 Saudi tax laws
were structured to report these royalty rates not as regular costs of doing
business, but as income tax. 114 Reporting these fees as income tax allowed
Mobil to take advantage of the clause outlined in their attack on Roby's
article, allowing Mobil to deduct these fees from what they would have
paid in United States taxes. 115 In a 1977 study, the House Ways and Means
Committee determined that oil companies claimed an income tax credit for
75% of the royalties they paid to Saudi Arabia." 6 The tax money lost by
106. Id. This 12.4% tax rate was at the time "the same rate that would be paid by a
private citizen who made less than $20,000 a year." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id (citation omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 62-63.
112. Id. at63.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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the United States was recoued from other taxpayers to the tune of more
than $2 billion every year.
Unfortunately, Mobil's attack on Roby's accurate article was
successful. UPI forbade Roby from writing further pieces on Mobil, or the
taxation of oil companies in general, despite the fact that Roby specialized
in reporting on energy issues for the UPI Washington, D.C., bureau. 1 8
Shortly thereafter, Roby left UPI.119
Mobil's actions are not uncommon within the corporate world; many
corporations have developed institutional advertising campaigns both to
offset any tarnishing of their image by truthful media reports, and to
attempt to squeeze out opposition to their products and goals. Corporations'
widespread purchase of institutional advertising solely to attack and weed
out such accurate media content because it undermines their corporate
image limits the diversity of viewpoints within the marketplace of ideas,
thereby stifling a primary goal of the First Amendment. If cable franchise
agreements could not block such advertising schemes from PEG channels,
then the ability of public access channels to act as "the video equivalent of
the speaker's soap box," as Congress envisioned, would be severely
restricted.
2. The Blackmail Power: When Advertisers Threaten to Withhold
Revenue
C. Edwin Baker, Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law at the
University of Pennsylvania, states, "Advertisers' power lies largely in their
willingness and ability to withdraw ads."'120 The media draw a tremendous
percentage of their revenue from advertisements. 12 1 Threats to withdraw
this tremendous percentage of revenue certainly frighten those controlling
the content of the media. Such threats constitute advertisers' blackmail
power. 1
22
117. Id.
118. Id. at65.
119. Id.
120. BAKER, supra note 91, at 54.
121. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 121. In 1981, almost five out of every six dollars
collected by newspapers, magazines, and television came from advertising revenue, a
statistic that remains true today. Id.
122. Some might argue that this "blackmail power" is not blackmail at all, but rather a
conscious, legal choice that advertisers may make as to where and how to spend their
advertising dollars; in other words, advertisers are exercising a lawful market power. While
this argument may be true in the abstract, its flaw is that it assumes that there are no special
considerations to be given to transactions taking place within the marketplace of ideas.
When advertisers combine what would ordinarily be a normal market power (i.e., a choice
to spend advertising dollars where they so desire) with threats designed to warp the
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In 1990, William Winter, head of the American Press Institute, said,
"There is not as much really tough, aggressive, hard-hitting, expensive-to-
do, investigative reporting right now as there was maybe half a dozen years
ago. ' 23 Winter attributed this change to the "bottom-line mentality" of the24
media. Norman Pearlstine, managing editor of the Wall Street Journal,
has questioned the media's will to "take on major institutions, major
organizations, important people in our society ... and to expose them as
thieves when it is appropriate."12 5 These statements are directly attributable
to pressures exerted by advertisers using their blackmail power.
Much blackmail power is exercised at the local level by automobile
dealers, a major source of local media revenue. 126 Local media sensitivity
to the whims of auto dealers often leads to stories being retracted, heavily
edited, or quashed altogether. One reporter noted, "We don't even bother
with auto-related stories anymore. ... These days, even a simple consumer
education story on how to buy a new car can draw the wrath of local car
dealers."' 127 In St. George, Utah, in 1990, car dealers boycotted the local
newspaper when it published an article urging consumers to bargain car
128dealers down to close to dealer cost for new cars. Due to the boycott, the
paper not only retracted the article, but it also issued a public apology,
claiming that the article was the result of an editor "exercising 'poor
judgment."" 29
Real estate dealers are also heavy users of their blackmail power at
the local level. In a national survey of real estate editors, 44% reported that
balanced coverage of real estate issues was prohibited out of "fear of
offending advertisers," while 80% reported instances of advertiser threats
marketplace into a forum most favorable to them (i.e., by threatening to withhold ad revenue
until media content meets their specific demands), it becomes less like a normal market
power and more like traditional definitions of blackmail. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
163 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "blackmail" as "A threatening demand made without
justification," and likening "blackmail" to "extortion."). When this "blackmail power" is
used within the special realm of the marketplace of ideas, it imposes severe limitations on
the goal of the First Amendment to foster a diversity of viewpoints.
123. RONALD K.L. COLLINS, DICTATING CONTENT: How ADVERTISING PRESSURE CAN
CORRUPT A FREE PRESS 11 (1992) (quoting Jonathan Kwitny, The High Cost of High Profits,
WASH. JOURNALISM REV., June 1990, at 19, 28).
124. Id. at 20.
125. Id. (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id. (quoting Herb Weisbaum, Advertisers Fight Back, IRE JOURNAL, Fall 1990 at
18).
128. Id. at 20.
129. Id. at 20-21 (footnote omitted).
A ROUND "PEG " FOR A ROUND HOLE
to withdraw ads due to negative coverage.' 3 ° One article, appearing in the
Times Union in Albany, New York, and subsequently in the Washington
Monthly and the Wall Street Journal under the headline, "How Your
Realtor Rips You Off," prompted an angry letter from The National
Association of Realtors and similar letters from individual Albany
realtors. 31 Although the editor of the Times Union stood behind the article,
the realtor response was not unnoticed. The paper created a "new, upbeat
real-estate section," and the writer of the article resigned.
3 2
The cigarette industry is perhaps America's most prolific user of its
blackmail power. 133 In 1983, Newsweek faced retribution for an article on
the rights of nonsmokers.' 3 4 After tobacco companies learned of the article,
they withdrew their advertising from that issue. 35 Newsweek reacted to this
and other similar actions of big tobacco by censoring three advertising
sections submitted to the magazine by the American Medical Association
between 1983 and 1985.136 Despite their health-oriented themes, the ads
contained little to no information on the effects of smoking on life
expectancy. 37 Newsweek editors cut references to smoking from the
supplements in deference to the big tobacco ad dollars. 138 In 1985, the
owner of The New Republic, Martin Peretz, pulled an article about smoking
hazards.139 An editor with the magazine, Leon Wieseltier, stated, "[I]n this
case I think it's true that we buckled before an advertiser .... The reason
the cigarette companies have such a grip on us is because of the relative
size of the account."
' 140
Many other magazines have followed these examples. Cosmopolitan
and Psychology Today refused advertisements for a stop-smoking clinic,
130. BAKER, supra note 91, at 54 (quoting Wendy Swallow Williams, Two New Surveys
Show the Industry's Reach, WASH. JOURNALISM REv., Nov. 1991, at 24, 24).
131. COLLINS, supra note 123, at 26.
132. Id. at 26.
133. Admittedly, cigarette companies cannot heavily influence the content of television
programming because it is illegal for them to advertise on television. Still, the big tobacco
examples do help illustrate the disturbing trend of the use of the blackmail power.
134. COLLINS, supra note 123, at 38.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Newsweek's actions were reportedly repeated by Time magazine. Id. A Time
spokesman defended the two magazines, stating, "Time, as does Newsweek, has a lot of
cigarette advertising. Do you carry material that's insulting to your advertiser?" Id.
(emphasis added) (citing James Warren, Is Media a Smokescreen for Tobacco Industry Ills?,
CHI. TRIn., March 20, 1985, at C4.).
139. Id. at 39.
140. Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
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stating that the advertisements would "offend their tobacco advertisers." 141
The advertising agency for Reader's Digest deserted the magazine when it
published an article on smoking risks. 142 When Mother Jones published an
article linking smoking with health risks, the tobacco companies canceled
their advertisements. 1
43
Some advertisers even admit to using their blackmail power to control
media content. Frank Anderson, president of the National Automobile
Dealers Association, told an audience of classified ad managers that "a
perception of anti-dealer bias could lead to lost ad revenue." 144 The
message conveyed to reporters was that they had to be more biased in favor
of car dealers or risk losing their advertising accounts. 145 Proctor &
Gamble publicly threatened to withdraw all ad revenue from TV stations
that broadcast a '"highly offensive" Folgers ad.' 46 After the company's
warning, most television stations refused to carry the commercial.'
4 7
Proctor & Gamble's use of their blackmail power far exceeds mere
protection of its own products. In 1965, the company issued a
memorandum demanding a certain quality of programming for
broadcasters carrying its advertising. 148 The memorandum stated that
"[t]here will be no material that may give offense, either directly or by
inference, to any commercial organization of any sort." 149  The
memorandum further required that "[c]haracters ... should reflect
recognition and acceptance of the world situation. . . . [W]riters should
141. BAKER, supra note 91, at 52-53.
142. Id. at 52 (footnote omitted). The desertion may have been rational. "When Saatchi
and Saatchi, a major advertising firm, prepared ads touting Northwest Airlines' no-smoking
policy, RJR/Nabisco, a food and cigarette conglomerate, canceled its $80 million contract
for advertising food products." Id. at 52-53 (footnote omitted).
143. Id.
144. COLLINS, supra note 123, at 25.
145. Id.
146. BAKER, supra note 91, at 54 (citing Brewing Trouble, THE ECONOMIST, May 26,
1990, at 70). The ad in question was sponsored by Neighbor-to-Neighbor, a political
advocacy group, and was supported by the National Council of Churches. Id. The ad stated:
"The murderous civil war in El Salvador has been supported by billions of American tax
dollars and by the sale of Salvadoran coffee.... Boycott Folgers. What it brews is misery
and death." Id. (quoting Thomas Palmer, P&G will resume ads on Channel 7 in '91,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1990, at 73-74).
147. Id. When one station, WHDH in Boston, broadcast the ad despite the Proctor &
Gamble warning, the company "withdrew all its advertising from the station, which had
been running about $1 million a year." Id. (footnote omitted).
148. Id. at 55.
149. Id. at 55 (quoted in ERIK BARNOUW, THE SPONSOR (1978) 112 (citation omitted)).
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minimize the 'horror' aspects [of war].... Men in uniform shall not be cast
as heavy villains or portrayed as engaging in any criminal activity."'
150
Proctor & Gamble's policy also specified the treatment that was to be
given to businessmen, clergy, and "similar representatives of positive social
forces."' 15 1 The company required broadcasters to counter any program's
attacks on any "basic conception of the American way of life."' 52 Finally,
the memorandum demanded that "no material on any of our programs...
[should] in any way further the concept of business as cold, ruthless, and
lacking all sentiment or spiritual motivation."' 153  The company's
advertising manager specified that these policies are to apply to
entertainment and news programs alike.
154
Despite advertisers' overt and covert demands, few editors and
journalists are willing to admit to censoring content at the whim of an
advertiser due to fear of advertiser and media owner retribution. 155 One
freelance writer's story idea was denied by a prominent woman's magazine
on the grounds that it would offend an important advertiser. 156 The
freelance writer refused to identify herself or the name of the magazine so
as not to alienate its editors. 57 A television station asked its consumer
reporter to censor coverage of certain restaurant practices, because the story
would offend restaurants advertising on the station. 158 Again, the reporter
refused to give his name or the name of the television station for fear of
retribution. 1
59
Unfortunately, fears of retribution may be well founded. In 1991, a
newspaper reporter was fired due to statements in the Washington
Journalism Review regarding his paper's favorable treatment of automobile
advertisers. 60 The editor of a magazine on the east coast was fired for
sparring with his publisher regarding the interference of advertisers with
the content of the magazine. In giving his story, the editor refused to
150. Id. (quoted in BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 156-57 (citation omitted)).
151. Id. (quoted in BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 157).
152. Id. (quoted in BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 157).
153. Id. (quoted in BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 157) (emphasis added). Proctor &
Gamble's reference to the content of the media as "our programs" very much reveals the
company's attitude towards broadcasters.
154. Id. (footnote omitted).
155. COLLINS, supra note 123, at 18.
156. Id. at 15.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 16.
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id. (footnote omitted).
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give his name or the name of the magazine for fear of jeopardizing possible
future employment. 
162
The examples described above represent only a small sample of a
much larger problem. Advertisers continually use their blackmail power,
the use of which often leads to any of three actions: (1) withdrawal of,
retraction of, or punishment for an already published story; (2) quashing of
an as yet unpublished story; or (3) affirmative steps on the part of the
media to ensure future compliance with the wishes of advertisers.
B. Creating a "Buying Mood"
In addition to garnering favorable treatment of their products and
goals, advertisers push for media content to create a "buying mood."
Especially in broadcasting, advertisers want the content surrounding their
ads to make the audience desire the product or service advertised.
163
Examples are plentiful. DuPont once told the FCC that its ads were more
effective when surrounded by "lighter, happier" content. 164 In 1980, ad
agencies hesitated to support Fania Fenelon, a CBS movie about a survivor
of Auschwitz, due to the movie's "utterly depressing nature." 165 Chrysler
withdrew advertising from Amerika, an ABC miniseries, stating, "our
upbeat product commercials would be both inappropriate and of diminished
effectiveness in that environment."' 166 A Coca-Cola vice president once
stated, "It's a Coca-Cola corporate policy not to advertise on TV news
because there's going to be some bad news in there and Coke is an upbeat,
fun product."1
6 7
This trend is certainly not a new one. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the
resistance of advertisers to support several critically acclaimed shows
nearly drove those shows off the air, despite their large audiences.
168
Advertisers spurned the shows due to the complexity of their messages,
which "made the simplicity of product commercial solutions seem
frivolous or fraudulent."' 69 Advertisers also feared that the characters
featured on the shows were too lower-class, stating that the "commercials
162. Id.
163. BAKER, supra note 91, at 62 (footnote omitted).
164. Id. (quoted in BAGIDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 160 (citation omitted)).
165. Id. at 63 (quoting Marvin E. Goldberg & Gerald J. Gorn, Happy and Sad TV
Programs: How They Affect Reactions to Commercials, 14 J. OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 387,
401 (citation omitted)).
166. Id. (quoting Goldberg & Gorn, supra note 165, at 401 (citation omitted)).
167. Id. (quoting Goldberg & Gorn, supra note 165, at 401(citation omitted)).
168. Id. (footnote omitted).
169. Id.
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looked out of place in Bronx settings."'7 ° Due to these perceived failings,
modem television series often rely on acceptable formulas and mechanisms
instead of allowing writers to take initiative to create new, bold ideas. 171
In short, advertisers increasingly wish to surround their commercials
with media content that supports the nature and messages of the ads.
Euphemistically, "[a]n ad for a sable fur coat next to an article on world
starvation is not the most effective association for making a sale."'172 One
result of this desire to create a buying mood is a lack of serious, thought-
provoking content in programming that might create any sort of negative
connotation with a product or service advertised therein. One of the few
remaining outlets for such thought-provoking programming, and the outlet
that is most accessible to the public, is public access television, where the
lack of commercials protects the content from advertisers' desire to mold
programs to fit their ads. Any bending of this protection for public access
content could be devastating for the medium, transforming public access
channels into pseudo-commercial broadcasters that carry the same bland,
thoughtless content that has overrun channels that are funded by
advertising revenue. If this possibility becomes a reality, public access
channels will no longer be able to effectively further the First
Amendment's goal of fostering a diversity of viewpoints.
C. Favoring the Affluent
in addition to garnering favorable treatment of products and goals and
creating a buying mood, advertisers further desire to shape the content of
the media so that it reaches an affluent audience. According to Pulitzer
Prize-winning journalist and dean emeritus of the Graduate School of
Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley, Ben Bagdikian,
"[A]n iron rule of advertising-supported media [is that it] is less important
that people buy your publication (or listen to your program) than that they
be 'the right kind' of people."' 7 3 This "right kind" of audience is an
audience that can and does spend, meaning one that is affluent. 174
Broadcasters and advertisers go to great lengths to ensure that the audience
has the right characteristics, using "reams of computer printouts" showing
audiences' "income, age, sex, marital status, ethnic background, social
170. Id. (quoting ERIK BARNOUW, THE SPONSOR 107 (1978)).
171. Id. (footnote omitted).
172. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 116.
173. Id. at 109.
174. Id.
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habits, residence, family structure, occupation and buying patterns" to
guarantee that programs and ads reach the perfect demographic. 
75
Examples of this mentality abound. In 1980, the president of Harte-
Hanks Century Newspaper Group noted that editors of the company's
twenty-eight daily newspapers were losing their "prejudices" about
separating content from the desire to reach the correct demographic,
stating, "The traditional view has been for editors to focus only on the total
circulation figures. Today we are seeing more editor emphasis on the
quality of circulation." 17 A study of the Gannett chain found that its
newspapers sought to eliminate many of its lower-income
subscribers. Otis Chandler, then head of the company owning the Los
Angeles Times, said, "The target audience of the Times is... in the middle
class and. .. the upper class[.] ... We are not trying to get mass
circulation, but quality circulation." 17 8 Chandler also stated, "We arbitrarily
cut back some of our low-income circulation[.] . . .The economics of
American newspaper publishing is based on an advertising base, not a
circulation base.
If, in fact, the broadcaster is not reaching the correct demographic, the
solution is simple: change the content.180 The media simply fill programs
with material designed to appeal to an affluent audience. Otis Chandler
noted that for the Los Angeles Times, writing more stories on minority
issues "would not make sense financially ... [because] that audience does
not have the purchasing power and is not responsive to the kind of
advertising we carry. ' 8 2 As stated by the general manager of Rolling Stone,
when the magazine wished to attract a more advertiser-friendly, affluent
audience, "The only way to deliver a different kind of reader is to change
editorial [content].""' Often, if an editor refuses to change the content to
satisfy the demographic demands of advertisers, the editor is fired.
184
In summation, advertisers are very specific about whom they want to
reach with their $30 billion campaigns. 185 To avoid the risk of the wrong
175. Id. at 109-10.
176. Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id.(citation omitted).
179. Id. (citation omitted).
180. Id. at I10.
181. Id.
182. BAKER, supra note 91, at 68 (quoting STEPHEN BATES, IF No NEWS, SEND RUMORS
198-99 (1989)).
183. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 110.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 115.
A ROUND "PEG " FOR A ROUND HOLE
kind of audience, advertisers and the media spend much time and effort on
surveys and computations that indicate the composition of the audiences of
particular programs. If those audiences are not of the right quality, meaning
composed of affluent free-spenders, the content of the program is often
changed to attract the right people. The only way for a medium to be free
of this mentality is to guarantee that it is not reliant on advertising dollars.
As of this moment, the content of public access channels is protected from
these pressures so long as municipalities are free to require in cable
franchise agreements that PEG channels remain free of advertising. If this
protection fades, meaningful public access to the airwaves may suffer due
to the pressure to create a certain quality of content to reach a certain
quality of audience.
IV. THE RISE OF GUERILLA MARKETING
As briefly noted in Section I, supra, corporate advertisers continually
seek new methods to market their products and services. Guerilla
marketing has appeared more and more frequently throughout American
society, but the effects of these strategies can most clearly be seen in the
content of broadcasters.
Perhaps the largest growing alternative marketing strategy is product
placement. Jay May, president of Feature This, an advertising agency based
in Burbank, California, claimed that "[p]roduct placement will go bonkers
in the future ... [due to fears that] TiVo, the Internet, and digital cable will
bleep out commercials [to the point] that, if you want to advertise on TV,
,- . .186
you'll have to [place products into the content of programs]. Successful
product placements are well integrated into the plots of movies and
television programs.' 8 7 Felicia Minei-Behr, senior vice president of
programming for ABC Daytime in New York City, recently called plot
integration the "future of advertising."' 188 The ultimate goal of alternative
marketing strategies is to combine products and content as "organically" as
possible. 89 To be completely "organic," advertisers often begin with a
product and build a script to fit that product. 190 Patti Regan, president of
The Regan Group in Los Angeles, stated, "If placement is executed
correctly, it's beneficial to both brand and network.... But if any aspect is
186. MacMillan, supra note 6.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. See On the Media: Built-In Commercial Television (WNYC radio broadcast, Aug.
2, 2002), transcript available at http://www.wnyc.org/onthemedia/transcripts/transcripts_
072602_tv.html [hereinafter Leshem Interview].
190. Id.
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compromised-if you do placement for placement's sake-it's less
effective.'
9 1
Many examples of such "organic" product placement have crept into
the programming lineups of the major television networks. ABC Daytime
recently signed a multi-million-dollar deal which will integrate the
cosmetics company Revlon into a twelve-week plotline on the soap All My
Children. 192 A fictional Revlon executive will appear in twenty-five
episodes of the soap, attempting to steal employees from the fictional
cosmetics company owned by Susan Lucci's character. 193 Felicia Minei-
Behr noted that "the key was that the placement was 'organic' to the
show's ongoing theme, because there is a danger that audiences may view
poorly developed marketing messages as an intrusion." 194 George
Schweitzer, executive vice president of marketing for CBS, admitted that
"[reality shows] were specifically created for integrated product placement
that meshes," noting that "[t]hey're not as dramatic or scripted, so [product
placement] lends itself well."'195 Ford Motor Company's Lincoln Mercury
division hosted a series of concerts on NBC's The Tonight Show with Jay
Leno.196 The segments, called the Lincoln Garage Concert Series, aired
from a stage flanked by Lincoln models, bringing approximately $9 million
worth of advertising to Ford. 197 The marketing arm of the Creative Artists
Agency, a large Hollywood talent agency, helped Coca-Cola obtain
, -.. 198
sponsorship of Fox Broadcasting's American Idol. Instead of offering
guests the hospitality of a "standard green room" while waiting backstage,
the program featured "the Coca-Cola Red Room," which contained "curvy
red couches" eerily reminiscent of the Coca-Cola logo. 199 Fox also gave
strong exposure to GMC's Yukon Excel in its drama 24.200 GMC also
placed its Yukon Denali on UPN's The Hughleys during a "'road trip'
episode."' 20 1 UPN both conceived of and executed the promotion.202 The
191. MacMillian, supra note 6.
192. Id.
193. Id
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Eisenberg, supra note 1.
199. Id.
200. MacMillan, supra note 6.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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key to the deal for the network was that the product was integrated directly
into the show's plot.
203
A brand new alternative marketing strategy contains a twist where the
products themselves become content on programs. 204 The online auction
house eBay is currently developing a show for users to describe their
collections on air.205 Dodge is producing the Fast Enuff Challenge, a one-
hour documentary to air on MTV featuring a nationwide contest to see who
can drive a Dodge vehicle the fastest.
20 6
Perhaps the most interesting example of "marketing as content" is
Live From Tomorrow. The series, planned for a six-week run on the
Warner Brothers' network, features segments dedicated to "fashion,
technology, movies, and sex."'2 07 Live From Tomorrow will air without
commercial breaks, because advertisements will be built into the content of
the program where products will form the basis for many of the show's
gimmicks. 20 Matti Leshem, executive vice president of Diplomatic, the
production company for Live From Tomorrow, touted a particular
hypothetical example featuring a new line of Sony Erickson cell phones
featuring cameras, proposing a game where contestants are given phones
and sent on a countrywide scavenger hunt.20 9 The contestant who uses the
phone to transmit the most interesting photographs of several American
landmarks would be the winner.
210
Leshem continued, "This is a show that says here's an interesting
product. We're interested in it. We think you'll be interested in it. And here
is a way for you to look at it that you might find appealing." 211 When asked
what distinguished this approach from product placement, Leshem
responded that product placement was much more "inorganic," and that
"[w]hat we've tried to do is actually build an organic script around a
product."' 2 12 Leshem defended Live From Tomorrow by stating, "I think
that the notion that there's something wrong with commercial products
203. Id.
204. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 41
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. MacMillan, supra note 6.
208. Ad Zappers, supra note 6.
209. Leshem Interview, supra note 189.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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being involved in our programming is a pretty old-fashioned idea. The
business of television is driven by commercials and is driven by
commercial money."
2 13
V. CONCLUSION
Advertisers want to shape media content so that it spreads only the
messages that the advertisers wish it to spread. The influence of advertisers
could have devastating impacts on the rights of the public to have
meaningful access to the public airwaves, especially in the wake of the
Second Circuit's decision in Goldberg v. Cablevision Systems Corporation.
Under this standard, PEG channels do not receive as much protection from
commercial broadcasting as they would under a strict interpretation of New
York State statutes and the New York City administrative code. The factors
articulated by the Goldberg court as to what constitutes commercial
programming, although somewhat strong, would have little impact in
preventing many of the forms of "alternative" or "guerilla" marketing that
are all too common today.
The thrust of this Note is not to urge commercial broadcast networks
to avoid such advertising schemes. Although such ad strategies pose many
difficulties that could prevent true freedom of the press in our democratic
society,2 14 this Note only urges states, municipalities, and cable franchisees
to include provisions in their cable franchise agreements such as those
found in the cable franchise agreement of the Town of Oyster Bay, New
York, prohibiting any level of commercial programming on public access
channels. Further, courts should take great care in interpreting these
statutory and contract provisions so as to minimize the dangers that
advertisers pose to the freedom of the public to have meaningful access to
public airwaves.
213. Id. In response, interviewer Brooke Gladstone asserted her belief that "people tend
to be more relaxed when there's a clear line between advertising and content. They seem to
be more comfortable when they know okay, now I'm being sold to and now I'm being
entertained." Id. Leshem responded:
Well I think you're making certain assumptions there that may or may not be
true. I think there's a group of young people out there who are really
interested and would understand that if we're showing them something, that
this new product is actually part of the show that we are presenting to them.
And we don't intend to hide that in any way; we want that to be unbelievably
transparent to the viewer; and we actually don't think that there's a problem
with it at all.
Id.
214. See generally BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89; BAKER, supra note 91; COLLINS, supra
note 123.
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This caution is especially prudent in light of the more covert
marketing strategies utilized by advertisers today. The development of
more "organic" methods of integrating products into the content of
television programs makes those advertisements much more difficult to
detect using the Goldberg factors. As it becomes more difficult to divorce
the product being sold from the content of the program, it also becomes
more difficult to determine whether or not an advertisement actually exists.
For instance, had not the creators of Live From Tomorrow admitted that
their program existed in part to sell products like Sony Erickson cellular
phones, and had not the creators of American Idol blatantly referred to the
backstage area as the "Coca-Cola Red Room," it would be very difficult to
tell that those programs were actually funded by Sony Erickson and Coca-
Cola. Without such blatant references, these programs would be likely
candidates to appear on public access channels under the Goldberg
standard.
The more that public airwaves are dominated by programs funded by
subversive corporate advertising, the less that public airwaves will be
accessible to the public at large. Corporate advertisers would then be free to
utilize the public airwaves as yet another outlet for their own agenda by
using their blackmail power to water down the content of public access
programming in order to create a buying mood among viewers and target
more affluent audiences.
Under this type of corporate influence, public access airwaves could
not be "the video equivalent of the speaker's soap box or the electronic
parallel to the printed leaflet," as Congress envisioned when passing the
CCPA. 2 15 Those "groups and individuals who generally have not had
access to the electronic media" would still not have "the opportunity to
become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas."
216
Corporate control of PEG channels would severely limit the ability of the
public airwaves to "contribute to an informed citizenry."
2 17
One of the traditional roles of the media is to ensure that citizens are
fully informed of any serious social and economic issues that might shape
America in the future. The promulgation of these important messages is
continually threatened by corporate advertisers' domination of the content
of privately owned broadcast outlets. Perhaps if the public at large
continues to be provided with meaningful access to the public airwaves,
more of these messages will continue to be disseminated. Meaningful
215. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4667.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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access will not occur, however, if the public-access airwaves are under as
much advertiser pressure as are commercial broadcasters. It is time for a
round, advertiser-free PEG to fit the round, public-access airwaves. Only
then can public access be truly meaningful.
